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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
VIRGINIA M. Corbitt, 
Petitioner, 
v. ] 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ) 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE ] 
FINANCING, ] 
Respondent. 
i Case No. 890674-CA 
i Category No. 14a 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This is a petition for review of a formal adjudicative 
proceeding. Jurisdiction to hear this petition is vested in the 
Court of Appeals by Utah Code Ann. §S 63-46b-16, 78-2a-3(2) (a) . 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Virginia M. Corbitt seeks review of a final decision of the 
Director of the Utah Department of Health (DOH), Division of Health 
Care Financing (DHCF), which affirmed in part and reversed in part 
a hearing officer's decision. The hearing officer found that 
Corbitt's first application for Medicaid was properly denied for 
failure to provide necessary verification of eligibility. The 
Director affirmed this holding. The hearing officer further found 
petitioner eligible for Medicaid on a second application, holding 
that a transfer on February 23, 1989 of certain assets was not 
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done in contemplation of an application for benefits under 
Medicaid. The hearing officer's order was reviewed by the Director 
of DHCF wh< i a f f i rmed t; he hear i ity of f i eei: as f o t. he 1 i rs L ruling, 
but reversed the second ruling, finding that the transfer of assets 
violated the agency's policies and procedures, thereby making 
petitioner ineligible for Medicaid * 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the Director of DHCF erroneously interpreted or 
applied the 1 .aw I n fi riding tha t petitioner's fi rst application was 
properly denied for a lack of verification? 
2. Whether the Director of DHCF erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law i ,:n fi nding that the transfer of certain assets on 
February 23, 1989 was done in order to qualify for Medicaid, 
thereby disqualifying petitioner from receiving benefits? 
3. Whether the Director of DHCF was illegally constituted as 
a decision-making body or was subject to disqualification because 
of his interest in the financial matters of the Utah Medicaid 
program? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a et seq. 42 C.F.R. S 435.911 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(2)(c)(2) Utah-DSS Vol. HIM § 565-2 
(1988) 2.B. (7-89) 
Utah-DSS V o l . H I M § 565-3 
2 . (11-89) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act provides that an 
appellate court may grant relief if it determines that a person 
2 
seeking review has been substantially prejudiced by the agency's 
erroneous interpretation or application of the law. Utah Code Ann. 
S 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1988). The Supreme Court has held that the 
correction-of-error standard applies to agency rulings on issues 
of law and extends no deference to them. Hurley v. Industrial 
Comm'n., 767 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988). Concerning issues 
involving mixed law and fact, an agency decision deserves some 
deference and will not be set aside unless it is unreasonable. Id. 
However, the deference given an agency in its area of expertise is 
not so expansive as to require a sanctioning of the agency's 
misinterpretation of its own statute and related rules. Boyd v. 
Dep't. of Empl. Sec., 773 P.2d 398, 400 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the case 
This is a request for review by the Court of Appeals of a 
final agency decision denying Virginia Corbitt Medicaid benefits. 
Corbitt requested a hearing, following denial of benefits on two 
applications for Medicaid benefits. The hearing officer found that 
Corbitt's initial application had been properly denied, since she 
had not supplied the necessary verification. He found that the 
denial of Corbitt's second application was improper, since property 
transferred by her prior to filing for Medicaid was done for 
purposes other than to qualify for Medicaid. The Director of DHCF 
reviewed the hearing officer's decision and affirmed the denial of 
the first application but reversed the second finding. Corbitt 
seeks reversal of the Director's decision and a declaration that 
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she has been eligible for Medicaid since the date of her original 
application. 
b. Course of Proceedings 
Corbitt filed her first application for benefits on March 16, 
1989. (Transcript of Hearing ("TH") 24) It was denied May 11# 
1989 for the reason that the necessary verification to determine 
eligibility was not provided. (Clerk's Notation of Record ("NR") 
53) Corbitt requested a hearing which was held September 12, 1989 
before Hearing Officer Cornelius Hyzer. (TH 2) The day prior to 
the hearing, Corbitt had filed a second application for Medicaid 
which was denied September 12, 1989 for the reason given that 
Corbitt had transferred her share in property held jointly with 
her son, Whitney Corbitt, on February 23, 1989 at less than fair 
market value and for the purpose of qualifying for Medicaid. (NR 
56) On September 20, 1989, the hearing officer affirmed the first 
denial but reversed the second, finding that Corbitt had not 
transferred property in order to qualify for Medicaid. (NR 28) The 
Director of the Medicaid agency reviewed the formal order and, in 
an order on review issued October 20, 1989, affirmed the first 
finding, but reversed the second. (NR 21) Corbitt filed her 
petition for writ of review on November 20, 1989. (NR 9) 
c. Disposition at the Medicaid Agency 
The final agency action denied Corbitt Medicaid on both of her 
applications. The final result of the agency's action is that she 
will remain ineligible for Medicaid up to 30 months from the date 
of transfer. (TH 51-52) 
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d. Relevant Facts 
Virginia Corbitt is an eighty-one-year-old woman who until 
June 1986 resided with her son, Whitney Corbitt, at a home owned 
jointly with him. (TH 48). At that time, Corbitt left the family 
home and moved to a retirement center. (TH 48) On September 12, 
1986, she deeded one-half of the home to her son by a quit claim 
deed. (NR 47) Corbitt remained in the retirement home until 
February 13, 1989 when she fell and was taken to St. Mark's 
Hospital. (TH 46-47) She remained in the hospital until February 
23, 1989 when she was transferred to Care West Nursing Home in Salt 
Lake City. (TH 46) 
Prior to leaving the hospital, Corbitt signed a quit claim 
deed conveying the other half interest in the home to her son, 
Whitney Corbitt. (TH 46, NR 51) She also signed a durable power 
of attorney, appointing her son, Whitney Corbitt, as her attorney 
in fact. (NR 49) 
At the time Corbitt was placed at Care West Nursing Home, she 
was receiving Medicare benefits which paid for her hospitalization 
and initial nursing home stay. (NR 73) On March 16, 1989, 
following expiration of her Medicare eligibility, Corbitt's son 
applied for Medicaid benefits on behalf of his mother. (TH 24) 
Whitney Corbitt obtained the Medicaid application from Christine 
DeBlasio, a social worker at Care West. (TH 4) Certain 
verification was needed for approval of the application, which 
Whitney Corbitt attempted to obtain. (TH 18-20) The requested 
verification was not supplied and the application was denied on May 
5 
11, 1989. (NR 53) A hearing was requested and held on September 
12, 1989 before Hearing Officer Cornelius Hyzer. (TH 2) The day 
before the hearing, Whitney Corbitt submitted a second application 
for Medicaid which was denied September 12, 1989. (NR 56) The 
reason given for the denial was that the applicant had transferred 
a share of her home in February 1989 without receiving fair market 
value and for the purpose of qualifying for Medicaid. (NR 56) 
Corbitt was advised that the sanction period for the denial would 
be the lesser of thirty months or the fair market value of the 
property transferred divided by $1,530.00. (NR 56) 
At the hearing, Whitney Corbitt appeared and testified that 
the verification required to complete the first application was 
delayed, because he had had difficulty obtaining documentation from 
his attorney. (TH 31) He testified that Virginia Corbitt conveyed 
the half interest in the home to him on February 23, 1989 on the 
advice of his attorney. (TH 44) He testified his mother was in the 
hospital at the time and that the transfer needed to be done, but 
was not done to hide assets in order to qualify for Medicaid. (TH 
44) The transfer was done, according to Whitney Corbitt, to avoid 
the possibility of his mother becoming incapable of signing over 
the title to him. (TH 44) He testified that the previous half 
interest was transferred to him in 1986 on the advice of his 
attorney in order to protect the property during a divorce 
proceeding. (TH 44) He testified that in February 1989, the 
divorce was final and it seemed to be a good time in which to 
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transfer the other half, since his ex-wife no longer had a claim. 
(TH 45, 56) 
The social worker, Christine DeBlasio, testified that at the 
time Virginia Corbitt was admitted to the nursing home, it was not 
expected that she would remain there for a long period of time. (TH 
8) She noted that petitioner's treating physician, Dr. John B. 
Stanchfield, had stated that to his knowledge Virginia Corbitt 
would be able to return to her home after a short stay at the 
nursing home. (NR 32, TH 9-10) DeBlasio testified that because of 
Virginia Corbitt's declining medical condition, including a series 
of small strokes, it was determined in mid-March that she would not 
be able to return home and that an application for Medicaid should 
be initiated. (TH 61-62) 
A representative of the Medicaid agency who appeared at the 
hearing, testified that Corbitt's second application was denied on 
the basis of state policy contained in Vol. Ill § 565-2. The 
representative testified that it is the Medicaid agency's policy 
to sanction a client who transfers property on the same day as 
entering a nursing home. (TH 51) The agency representative 
testified in part: 
[B]ecause of the situation, because of the 
medical condition at the point of the transfer 
with her medical condition being that way and 
entry into the nursing home on that same day, 
we were basically saying that it was a 
transfer to become eligible for Medicaid, so 
we would apply the sanctions that I have just 
indicated there. (TH 54) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Federal Medicaid regulations controlling Corbitt's case do not 
mandate a denial of Medicaid benefits, when verification is not 
completed within a 45-day period. A Medicaid agency is permitted 
to keep the file open indefinitely, pending completion of the 
application by the claimant. In this case, the Director erred in 
finding that Corbitt's initial application was properly denied. 
The Federal statutes and regulations provide that a Medicaid 
applicant who seeks benefits for nursing home care may be denied 
eligibility for a transfer of assets, unless a satisfactory showing 
is made that the transfer was for purposes other than to qualify 
for Medicaid. In this case, the hearing officer correctly found 
that the transfer of assets was proper. The Director of DHCF, in 
reviewing the hearing officer's decision, applied an erroneous 
standard by concluding that an inference of ineligibility may be 
drawn when an applicant enters a nursing home on the same day she 
transfers property. The Director articulated no legitimate reasons 
for reversing the favorable decision. But for the improper state 
policy, the Director should have affirmed the hearing officer's 
decision finding Virginia Corbitt eligible for Medicaid. 
The Director was not an impartial person for purposes of 
reviewing the hearing officer's decision. He had an interest in 
the financial affairs of the Medicaid program. Thus, he should 




THE DIRECTOR'S DECISION UPHOLDING THE DENIAL OF CORBITT'S 
FIRST APPLICATION FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE VERIFICATION 
SHOULD BE REVERSED, SINCE IT IS BASED ON AN ERRONEOUS 
INTERPRETATION OR APPLICATION OF THE MEDICAID LAW. 
The hearing officer held, and the Director of DHCF affirmed, 
that Corbitt was not entitled to Medicaid eligibility on the basis 
of her March 16, 1989 application, for the stated reason that she 
had not provided verification as required by state policy and 
procedure. Corbitt's son, Whitney Corbitt, applied for benefits 
on March 16, 1989 on behalf of his mother and was advised to 
provide certain verification by March 28, 1989. Her son was unable 
to obtain the necessary documentation until the time of the hearing 
on September 12, 1989. Certain bank records were provided to the 
hearing officer within five days of the hearing as requested. (NR 
13-20) However, the hearing officer held the denial of the first 
application to be proper, because Corbitt's son failed to provide 
the requested verification within the time limit set by the 
caseworker. The caseworker testified that there was "a time period 
of 45 days" in which to make a decision on Corbitt's application. 
(TH 25) Caseworker Anita Peterson also testified that 45 days was 
the limit for processing an application: "There's 45 days or we 
have to deny." (TH 28) 
The hearing officer noted that the 45 day time limit for 
providing verification may be extended by the agency, but concluded 
it was unreasonable to expect the application to be held open 
indefinitely pending verification. (NR 29) A review of the 
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Medicaid statute and regulation shows that a Medicaid agency is 
not required to deny Medicaid when verification is not provided 
within the 45-day time limit. The Director has failed to identify 
a sufficient legal basis for concluding that the March 16, 1989 
application was properly denied. 
Medicaid is a complicated federal/state health program which 
has been described as "among the most intricate ever drafted by 
Congress." Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43, 69 L.Ed. 
2d 460, 101 S. Ct.2633 (1981). Since Medicaid is a joint health 
care effort between the federal government and participating state 
governments, legal determinations necessarily involve a 
consideration of both state and federal law, with federal law 
controlling under the Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution. 
This interrelationship has been well summarized in the case of 
Buc kner v. Maher, 424 F.Supp. 366, 369 (D. Conn. 1976). 
Implementation of a Medicaid program is authorized in the state of 
Utah by Utah Code Ann. S 26-18-2.1 (1988). 
Neither the relevant federal statute nor the implementing 
regulation prescribes a strict time limit for determining Medicaid 
eligibility. The relevant portions of the federal Medicaid statute 
provide as follows: 
A state plan for medical assistance must — 
.... 
(8) provide that all individuals wishing to 
make application for medical assistance under 
the plan shall have opportunity to do so, and 
that such assistance shall be furnished with 
reasonable promptness to all eligible 
individuals; 
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(19) provide such safeguards as may be 
necessary to assure that eligibility for care 
and services under the plan will be 
determined, and such care and services will be 
provided, in a manner consistent with 
simplicity of administration and the best 
interests of the recipients; 
(34) provide that in the case of any 
individual who has been determined to be 
eligible for medical assistance under the 
plan, such assistance will be made available 
to him for care and services included under 
the plan and furnished in or after the third 
month before the month in which he made 
application (or application was made on his 
behalf in the case of a deceased individual) 
for such assistance if such individual was (or 
upon application would have been) eligible for 
such assistance at the time such care and 
services were furnished; 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8),(19),(34) 
• The relevant federal regulation governing timely 
determinations of eligibility is found at 42 C.F.R. § 435.911 and 
provides as follows: 
(a) The agency must establish time standards 
for determining eligibility and inform the 
applicant of what they are. These standards 
may not exceed — 
(1) Sixty days for applicants who apply for 
Medicaid on the basis of disability; and 
(2) Forty-five days for all other 
applicants. 
(b) The time standards must cover the 
period from the date of application to the 
date the agency mails notice of its decision 
to the applicant. 
(c) The agency must determine eligibility 
within the standards except in unusual 
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circumstances, for example — 
(1) When the agency cannot reach a decision 
because the applicant or an examining 
physician delays or fails to take a required 
action, or 
(2) Where there is an administrative or 
other emergency beyond the agency's control. 
(d) The agency must document the reasons 
for delay in the applicant's case record. 
(e) The agency must not use the time 
standards — 
(1) As a waiting period before determining 
eligibility; or 
(2) As a reason for denying eligibility 
(because it has not determined eligibility 
within the time standards). 
The state policy and procedure manual which applies the 
federal laws provides: 
Eligibility Decisions 
1. Deadline for Determining Eligibility 
A. An eligibility decision must be made within 45 days 
of the date of the application. There is one exception: 
a decision must be made within 90 days of the date of the 
application if a disability determination must be made 
as part of the eligibility determination. 
If a decision cannot be made before the deadline, 
document the cause of the delay in the case record. 
Utah-DSS Vol. IIIM § 703-5 l.A. 
Verification 
What Must Be Verified? 
All factors of eligibility must be verified. 
There is only one exception to this rule. It is called 
"The Prudent Person Concept". This assumes that, as a 
prudent person, you can use your professional judgment 
to decide if something can be left unverified. If you 
decide to accept the client's word for something instead 
of verifying it, document it in the case record or 
application form. Utah-DSS Vol. IIIM S 731-1. 
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Who Must Provide Verification? 
It is the responsibility of the applicant or recipient 
to obtain acceptable verification of eligibility factors. 
Help the client to get the verification if the client 
needs help. Utah-DSS Vol. IIIM § 731-2. See Addendum 
The federal law and regulations do not mandate denial of a 
Medicaid application when the applicant does not complete 
verification within a forty-five day period. Instead, the law sets 
out a general requirement of forty-five days, with certain 
exceptions. One of the exceptions contained in the federal 
regulation is when the applicant delays in taking a required 
action. In this case, the providing of additional verification was 
a required action which was delayed by causes beyond Corbitt's 
control. She relied on her son, Whitney Corbitt, to accomplish her 
Medicaid eligibility. He testified that because of his inability 
to obtain documents from his lawyer, it was not possible to 
complete the application within the stated time period. (TH 31) 
This should have been considered by the hearing officer as an 
extenuating circumstance which, under the federal regulation, would 
permit the application file to be kept open beyond the forty-five 
day time limit. The Medicaid agency caseworker should not have 
closed Corbitt's file, but should have simply noted in the file the 
reason for the delay. Instead, the caseworker applied an improper 
state policy which directed denial at the end of 45 days. 
A state Medicaid agency cannot adopt a policy which 
contradicts federal law. It is well established in the case law 
that a state regulation is invalid if found to be inconsistent with 
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the federal statute governing the program. Townsend v. Swank, 404 
U.S. 282, 286, 92 S. Ct. 502, 30 L.Ed. 2d 448 (1971); King v. 
Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333, 88 S. Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed. 2d 1118 (1968). 
While a state's participation in Medicaid is voluntary, once it 
elects to participate in the program, it must fully comply with 
federal statutes and regulations. Smith v. Miller, 665 F.2d 172, 
175 (7th Cir. 1981). A participating state does have some 
discretion in establishing time limits for filing claims, but such 
limits have been construed as directory in nature, from which 
exception should be granted to avoid an injustice when the facts 
so demand. Matter of King James Nursing Home, 351 A.2d 363, 367 
(1976). 
When the facts in the case are considered in light of the 
above-referenced law, it should be concluded that Corbitt was 
improperly denied Medicaid eligibility on her first application. 
The hearing officer did not consider the express language of the 
federal regulation which permits additional time for determining 
eligibility when delays are caused by the applicant. Since the 
federal law does not require a denial of an application under these 
circumstances, any explicit or implicit requirements in the state 
regulations requiring denial are inconsistent and invalid under the 
Supremacy Clause. The federal regulation clearly reflects 
congressional intent to permit exceptions to a harsh time limit 
when equity and justice so require. The facts of this case 
demonstrate a solid basis for such an exception. Corbitt was 
incapable of completing her own Medicaid application. She relied 
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on the assistance of her son who made a good faith effort to comply 
with the caseworker's requirements. Since the federal law does not 
strictly require compliance with a forty-five-day time limit, the 
hearing officer should have granted more latitude and considered 
the date of the first application as the effective date of 
eligibility. 
POINT II 
THE DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED, SINCE THE 
DIRECTOR ERRED IN APPLYING THE LAW IN FINDING 
THAT CORBITT TRANSFERRED ASSETS IN ORDER TO 
QUALIFY FOR MEDICAID. 
The Medicaid statute has for some time allowed states to 
impose a penalty on persons who transfer assets in order to qualify 
for Medicaid to cover nursing home expenses. Until recently, the 
sanctioning of persons who made such transfers was optional. 42 
U.S.C. S 1396p(c)(1983). The statute provided that states could 
deny assistance when a transfer was made within 24 months of 
application, provided they specified a procedure implementing such 
denial which was no more restrictive than that set forth in 42 
U.S.C. § 1382b(c)(1983). The referenced section was contained in 
that portion of the Social Security Act governing the Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) program and contained a similar penalty for 
transfers during a 24-month period. Additionally, the statute 
created a presumption that such transfers were made to establish 
eligibility for assistance unless the applicant furnished 
"convincing evidence to establish that the transaction was 
exclusively for some other purpose." 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(c)(2)(1983) 
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On July 1, 1988, the statutes referenced above were amended. 
The Medicaid statute was amended to require states to sanction 
individuals who transferred property for less than fair market 
value during a 30-month period prior to applying for Medicaid. 42 
U.S.C. S 1396p(c)(1)(1988) Deleted from the Medicaid statute was 
the previous cross-reference to the SSI statute in 42 U.S.C. § 
1382b(c). Instead, the Medicaid statute was revised to provide 
that an individual need only make a "satisfactory showing" that the 
transfer was made for a purpose other than to qualify for Medicaid. 
Specifically/ the statute now reads: 
(2) An individual shall not be ineligible for 
medical assistance by reason of paragraph (1)_ 
to the extent that — 
(C) a satisfactory showing is made to the 
State (in accordance with any regulations 
promulgated by the Secretary) that (i) the 
individual intended to dispose of the 
resources either at fair market value, or for 
other valuable consideration, or (ii) the 
resources were transferred exclusively for a 
purpose other than to qualify for medical 
assistance. 42 U.S.C. S 1396p(c)(2)(C)(1988) 
At the time of Corbitt's hearing, the hearing officer applied 
state regulations which were not in strict compliance with the 
federal statute. Included in the record as Exhibit 4 is Section 
565-2 of Vol. IIIM regarding transfers of assets on or after July 
1# 1988. (NR 57) The applicable portion of that regulation 
provided as follows: 
Do not sanction the client if the client can 
prove the asset was not transferred in order 
to become eligible for Medicaid. It is the 
client's responsibility to provide evidence 
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that a transfer was made for another purpose 
AND that Medicaid was not even a minor factor 
in the decision. If a reliance upon Medicaid 
can be inferred, sanction the client. 
(emphasis added) Utah DSS-Vol. IIIM § 565-2 
(7-89)1 
Despite the state's use of a regulation which was more 
restrictive than required by the Medicaid statute, the hearing 
officer correctly found that Corbitt had established sufficient 
evidence to overcome the presumption that she had transferred 
property to her son in order to qualify for Medicaid. Although the 
hearing officer did not use the "satisfactory showing" standard, 
it is clear from his decision that he felt the resources in 
question were transferred for a purpose other than to qualify for 
Medicaid. Reviewing the hearing officer's decision in light of the 
correct standard cited above, it should be concluded that his 
decision was based on substantial evidence as articulated in his 
decision. Because of its relevance, the hearing officer's summary 
is quoted in extenso: 
xThe pertinent section has since been revised to remove the 
offensive final sentence. The most recent version of the IIIM 
manual reads: 
Do not sanction the client if the client can 
prove the asset was not transferred in order 
to become eligible for Medicaid. It is the 
client's responsibility to provide evidence 
that a transfer was made for another purpose 
AND that Medicaid was not even a minor factor 
in the decision. Follow the guidelines in 
Sec. 565-3. Utah-DSS Vol. IIIM § 565-2.B (2-
90) 
The guidelines referred to in section 565-3 are contained in 
the Addendum. 
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The Petitioner in this case was fully aware of 
her desire to transfer her assets as an 
inheritance to her son and had taken steps to 
do so in 1986. Under advice of counsel, and 
with a divorce pending, it was prudent to 
delay the transfer of the remaining equity in 
the property to him until the divorce was 
concluded. The testimony of the Petitioner's 
son was that there was no expectation 
whatsoever that she would be requiring 
Medicaid when she had other insurance 
available and it was anticipated that this 
would be short term stay. It was the 
intervening small strokes that caused the 
petitioner to lose her mental faculties, 
creating a pressing need to obtain Medicaid 
benefits. This all took place subsequent to 
the quit claim deed being signed on February 
23, 1989. The law provides for a presumption 
that the transfer of assets was done in 
contemplation of application for Medicaid 
benefits, but the testimony of the 
Petitioner's son rebuts the presumption and 
therefore prevails. The only evidence 
presented at the hearing on this issue showed 
that the Petitioner was anticipated to have a 
short stay at the nursing home which would 
preclude any expectation of a long term stay, 
especially of the type of serious nature that 
developed in this Petitioner's medical 
condition. (NR 28) See Addendum 
When the hearing officer's decision reached the Director of 
DHCF, an incorrect standard was applied in reviewing the findings. 
The Director states in his decision: 
In this case, the Division of Health Care 
Financing finds that based upon the hearing 
record, a reliance upon Medicaid can be 
inferred....Reliance upon Medicaid can be 
inferred when an eighty-one-year-old woman 
such as petitioner enters a nursing home, 
gives her son the power-of-attorney and quit 
claims her dwelling to him on the same 
day....However, a reasonable inference can be 
drawn that reliance upon Medicaid was 
contemplated....(emphasis added) (NR 23-24) 
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The Director erred in not applying the proper standard for 
judging whether a transfer of assets was made to qualify for 
Medicaid. The statute clearly requires that an applicant need only 
make a "satisfactory showing"; it says nothing about drawing an 
inference from facts established at the hearing. The hearing 
officer had already found that the presumption of a disqualifying 
transfer had been overcome. To allow the Director in reviewing the 
decision to draw a different inference from the facts results in 
the presumption being reconstituted and, in effect, makes it 
irrebuttable. Such a result is not condoned in the law. See 
People in Interest of S.P.B., 651 P.2d 1213, 1217 (Colo. 1982). 
Reliance on an inference in a case of this type was rejected 
in Harrison v. Comm'r, 529 A.2d 188 (Conn. 1987) wherein the 
Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed a transfer of assets under the 
old statute. The Connecticut Medicaid agency had included a 
"foreseeability test" in its manual and provided that if an 
applicant had failed to retain sufficient assets to meet 
foreseeable needs for 24 months after the transfer, "it must be 
inferred" that the transfer was not made exclusively for some other 
purpose than to qualify for Medicaid. The court began its analysis 
by noting the fundamental rule that an administrative agency must 
act within its statutory mandate and "has no authority to modify, 
abridge or otherwise change the statutory provisions under which 
it acquires authority." Id., at 192. The court reviewed the 
Connecticut regulations under the old "convincing evidence" 
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standard of 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(c) and concluded that the department 
policy was inconsistent with federal and state statutes. 
An overly restrictive transfer of assets rule was also 
reviewed and rejected in Randall v. Lukhard, 709 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 
1983) The court held that a Virginia rule requiring documentary 
evidence in every case showing that a claimant has other resources 
available at the time of transfer to cover present and expected 
future medical expenses was excessive. The court found it highly 
improbable that disabled individuals would be able to objectively 
demonstrate availability of other assets to avoid disqualification. 
The court stated: 
We think that they should not be rendered 
ineligible if by other credible evidence, 
short of documentary proof, they can establish 
that theirs was a lawful purpose. Id., at 267 
In Downer v. State Dep't of Human Resources, 705 P.2d 144 (Nev. 
1985), a ninety-year-old individual who transferred property to his 
daughter and son-in-law prior to applying for Medicaid was held to 
be not disqualified. The court concluded that the Medicaid 
applicant could not have anticipated an application for Medicaid, 
because he believed his death was imminent. 
Recent amendments to respondent's regulations further suggest 
that the "inference" language is not permissible. As noted, the 
offending sentence has now been removed. See supra. at 17, n.l. 
Second, a set of guidelines has been added for determining whether 
a transfer was made in order to qualify for Medicaid. Utah-DSS 
Vol. IIIM § 565-3 (11-89). Although the guidelines may be 
questionable in light of Randall v. Lukhard, supra, they do contain 
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two criteria which lend support to petitioner's argument. The 
section provides in part: 
Some Factors Indicating the Transfer Was Not 
to Become Eligible 
Here is a list of some factors which may 
indicate the client did not transfer assets to 
become eligible and did not expect Medicaid to 
meet his needs after the transfer. This list 
is not all-inclusive. 
A. The client suddenly, unexpectedly, became 
disabled AFTER the transfer. 
B. The client learned that he has a disabling 
condition AFTER the transfer. Utah-DSS 
Vol. IIIM § 565-3 2. (11-89) 
In this case, the evidence established, and the hearing 
officer found, that Corbitt's incapacitating condition arose after 
she was admitted to the nursing home on February 23, 1989. Based 
on respondent's own regulations, that finding is entitled to 
substantial weight. The hearing officer who reviewed Corbitt's 
case, and who had the best opportunity to judge her credibility, 
concluded that the transfer of property was not made for a 
disqualifying purpose. When his decision was reviewed by the 
Director, an improper standard utilizing an inference was applied. 
At the time of the review, the Medicaid statute did not contain any 
language allowing the Director of DHCF to draw an inference from 
facts established at a hearing. Instead, the Director was required 
to determine whether a satisfactory showing had been made that the 
transfer was for some purpose other than to qualify for Medicaid. 
The Director articulated no legitimate reasons for reversing the 
hearing officer's decision. His reversal represents an arbitrary 
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act in complete disregard of the Medicaid statute. Under the 
principles of law governing the relationship between the state and 
federal participants in the Medicaid program, it was improper for 
the Director to apply such a standard. A review of the law and the 
record shows that the hearing officer applied the correct legal 
standard and identified substantial evidence upon which to base 
his decision. Therefore, the Director's decision should be 
reversed and the hearing officer's holding reinstated, finding 
Corbitt eligible for Medicaid. 
POINT III 
THE DIRECTOR'S DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED 
SINCE HE WAS SUBJECT TO DISQUALIFICATION 
BECAUSE OF HIS FINANCIAL INTEREST IN 
THE MEDICAID PROGRAM. 
The statute establishing the Medicaid program also provides 
that an opportunity for a fair hearing must be provided to 
individuals denied medical assistance. 42 U.S.C. S 1396a(3) (1983). 
The statute is implemented in the federal regulations at 42 C.F.R. 
S 431.200 et seq.. The regulation provides that the state's 
hearing system must provide for: 
(1) a hearing before the agency; or 
(2) an evidentiary hearing at the local level, with the 
right of appeal to a state agency hearing. 
42 C.F.R. S 431.205(1985) 
The regulation then provides that if a local evidentiary hearing 
decision is adverse to an applicant or recipient, the agency must 
inform the individual of a right of appeal to the state agency. 
42 C.F.R. S 431.232 The regulations require that a state plan 
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provide the necessary means for meeting the hearing requirements 
listed. 
The state of Utah provides hearing rights in its regulations 
for applicants and recipients. Utah Admin. Code § R455-14 et seq.. 
A hearing officer is to conduct a fair hearing, but is not 
empowered to issue a final agency decision. Instead, at the 
conclusion of the formal hearing, the hearing officer is to submit 
a recommended decision to the executive director of DOH who will 
then decide whether to accept or reject it. Judicial review is 
then to be allowed from the executive director's decision. See 
Addendum. 
The result of the review system established by the state of 
Utah DOH is that every fair hearing decision is reviewed by the 
Director of the Medicaid program who is also responsible for 
conserving the limited resources of the Medicaid program. Utah 
provides by statute for creation of DHCF and for the appointment 
of a Director by the DOH executive director. Utah Code Ann. § 26-
18-2.2. Among the responsibilities of the director of DHCF is to 
"prepare and administer the division's budget..." Id. The statute 
further provides that the division "is responsible for the 
effective and impartial administration of this chapter in an 
efficient, economical manner." Utah Code Ann. § 26-18-2.3. 
Finally, it provides: 
The division shall establish, on a statewide 
basis, a program to safeguard against 
unnecessary or inappropriate use of Medicaid 
services, excessive payments, and unnecessary 
or inappropriate hospital admissions or 
lengths of stay. Id. 
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It is well established in the law that an adjudicator of an 
administrative claim is disqualified if he has a pecuniary interest 
in the outcome. Myer v. Niles Township, 477 F.Supp. 357, 362 (N.D. 
111. 1979). The adjudicator is disqualified even if the pecuniary 
interest is no more than an indirect outgrowth of a desire to 
protect official funds. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 
57, 93 S. Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed. 2d 267(1972) (A mayor responsible for 
village finances and whose court generated village funds was 
disqualified from trying traffic offenses.) In Myer, the court 
held that a panel of township supervisors who had the sole 
discretion to determine an applicant's eligibility for medical 
indigent benefits and who also had an interest in protecting 
township funds could not provide a fair hearing before an unbiased 
decision-maker. Myer v. Niles Township, supra, at 362. 
In this case, Director Betit has a direct, statutorily-
mandated obligation to protect and conserve scarce Medicaid funds. 
Given Director Betit's pecuniary interest in protecting Medicaid 
funds, he could not act as an impartial agency officer in reviewing 
Corbitt's claim. Therefore, he should have been disqualified from 
reviewing the hearing officer's decision. 
CONCLUSION 
The Director erred in finding that Corbitt's first application 
was correctly denied. He further erred in reversing the hearing 
officer and finding a disqualifying transfer of assets. The 
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Director's decision should be reversed and Medicaid benefits 
granted from the date of the first application. 
Respectfully submitted this,^/C-~ day of //7^/^A^ , 1990. 
[CHAEL E. BULSON 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this &< /~^~ day of /''/tt/i&vi . 
1990, I served copies of the above BRIEF OF PETITIONER by First-
class mail, postage prepaid, upon: 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Attorney General of Utah 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
J. Stephen Mikita 
Assistant Attorney General 
120 N. 200 W. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84401 
*L-
[CHAEL E. BULSON 
Attorney at Law 
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VOLUME IIIM 2-90 
TRANSFER OF ASSETS - Transfers On or After July 1, 1988 
565-? * Ji'MLf_eiis„Oii._or_After..Jul^/ JJ_l_98_8 
1. When to Sanction C1.Lenjs 
Sanction clients who transfer assets for less than fair market 
value to become eligible for Medicaid. It does not matter if 
the client is a resident of a medical institution or approved 
for the Home and Lommunity-Based Care Haiver at the time of the 
transfer. 
2. Hhen NOT to Sanction _CLtents 
Do not sanction clients in these situations: 
A6 Do not sanction the client if the asset was transferred 
more than 30 months prior to the date of the application. 
B. Do not sanction the client if the client can prove the 
asset was not transferred in otder to become eligible for 
Medicaid. It is the client's responsibility to provide 
evidence that a transfer was made for another purpose AND 
that Medicaid was not even a minor factor in the decision. 
Follow the guidelines in Sec. 565-3. 
C. Do not sanction the client if the sanction would be an 
undue hardship. Follow the rules in Sec. 565-4. 
D. Do not sanction the client if the transfer fits one of the 
following situations. (The "5 OK Transfers") 
(1) Transfer .of a home to the spouse. 
(2) Transfer of any asset to a spouse OR a blind or 
disabled son or daughter. 
(3) Transfer of a home to a son or daughter under 21 years 
of age. 
(4) Transfer of a home to a sibling who has an equity 
interest in the home and who has lived in the home for 
at least 1 year Immediately preceding the client's 
entry into a medical institution. 
(5) Transfer of a home to a son or a daughter who has 
lived In the home and cared for the client for at 
least 2 years prior to the individual's entry into the 
medical institution. 
VOLUME IIIM 2-90 
TRANSFER OF ASSETS - Transfers On or After July 1, 1988 
3. Secondary Transfers After October 1. 1989 
If assets have been transferred without sanction because the 
situation Is one Identified 1n Sec. 565-2 #2(D), sanction the client 
1f the asset 1s transferred again AFTER October 1, 1989 for less than 
fair market value. 
Sanction the Individual making the first transfer. The sanction 
period for the Individual must be based on the value of the asset 
that person transferred. If the person making the secondary transfer 
also transfers some of his own assets 1n addition to the assets 
received from the first transfer, that person may also be sanctioned. 
The sanction period for either Individual begins on the date of the 
secondary transfer. 
THERE IS ONE EXCEPTION TO THIS RULE: Do not sanction anyone if the 
secondary transfer also fits one of the situations In Sec. 565-2. 
EXAMPLE: 
Mary and Boh Jones were both identified on the deed as own^s of their home, which 
is worth $36,000. Before entering a nursing home in June, Mary transfeired her J/2 
interest in the home to her husband. Mary was not sanction for this transfer because 
Sec. 565-2 #2(D) says that a client may transfer any asset to a spouse without being 
sanctioned. 
In October, Bob Jones signed a quit claim deed giving the house to his son for $L00. 
His son is over 21, not disabled, and had not been living in the house prior to the 
transfer. Bob is sanctioned for the transfer of his half of the house. Marv is sanctioned 
for the half of the house she gave to Bob and he transferred. The sanctions begin in 
August for both of them. 
4. How to Sanction the Client 
Clients who are sanctioned for transferring assets are not eligible 
for institutional care or Home and Community-Based Care. They may be 
eligible for regular Medicaid services. Apply the Medicaid policy in 
Volume H I D . 
Report the client's name and PACMIS ID number to either PDU or Health 
Care Financing. You may do this on the phone, In writing, or by 
PACMIS Mailbox addressed to Jennifer P. Lee. 
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TRANSFER OF ASSETS - Transfers On or After July 1, 1988 
5• Setting the Sanction Period 
A. The period of ineligibility begins with the month in which the 
assets were last transferred. The client is ineligible for the 
LESSER of: 
(1) 30 months, OR 
(2) the number of months resulting from dividing the 
uncompensated value by the average private-pay rate for 
nursing homes. The uncompensated value is the difference 
between the equity value of the transferred asset and the 
amount of money received by the client for it. (Equity 
value is the fair market value minus any indebtedness 
against the asset.) See Table II for the average 
private-pay rate for nursing homes. 
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TRANSFER OF ASSETS - Transfer to Become Eligible 
565-3 Transfer to Become Eligible 
Do not sanction the client if the client can prove that Medicaid was 
not a reason for the transfer. The client must also prove that he 
did not expect Medicaid to meet his needs after transferring the 
asset. 
l. Verification 
It is the client's responsibility to provide all supporting 
documentation, such as legal documents, realtor agreements, 
relevant correspondence, and statements from other individuals. 
If the client needs help getting these, a worker may help. 
If the client claims that Medicaid was not a factor in the 
decision to transfer the asset, ask the client to write a 
statement explaining: 
Ae The reason for the transfer 
B. Attempts to transfer the asset for fair market value 
C. The reason for accepting less than fair market value 
D. The client's plans for providing for himself after the 
transfer 
E. The client's relationship to the new owner of the asset 
F. Hhy the client believes he received fair market value for 
the asset 
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TRANSFER OF ASSETS - Transfer to Become Eligible 
2. Some Factors Indicating the Transfer Was Not to Become Eligible 
Here 1s a list of some factors which may Indicate the client did 
not transfer assets to become eligible and did not expect 
Medicaid to meet his needs after the transfer. This list 1s not 
all-inclusive. 
A. ThS client suddenly, unexpectedly, became disabled AFTER 
the transfer. 
B. The client learned that he had a disabling condition AFTER 
the transfer. 
C. The client unexpectedly lost other assets, worth more than 
the Medicaid asset limit, AFTER the transfer. 
D. The transfer was court-ordered. 
E. The assets were transferred to a religious order by a 
member of that order In accordance with a vow of poverty. 
EXAMPLES; 
Mr. Johnson applied for Medicaid in May. The previous June, he had sold assets 
worth $8,000 for $0,000. He explained that he sold the assets to pay $4,000 in medical 
bills. He accepted less than fair market value because he needed the money quickly 
and could not wait for a better offer. When he transferred the money, his countable 
assets were too high for Medicaid because he also owned farmland in Nevada wotth 
$12,000. In January, he and his wife separated. She was given the farmland in the 
divorce decree. Now his assets are below the asset limit. Mr. Johnson's claim that he 
did not transfer the assets to become eligible should be accepted because he tried to 
sell the asset for fair market value AND he would have remained ineligible for 
Medicaid if he had not unexpectedly lost the farmland. 
In February, Mrs. Mason transferred assets worth $53,000 to her daughter in exchange 
for a life estate in the daughter's home. The life estate is worth $40,000. She did it 
because she was elderly and no longer able to live alone. She did not want to move 
into her daughter's home without paying her for it in some way. DO NOT accept Mrs. 
Mason's claim that the transfer was not done to become eligible. Mrs. Mason knew 
that she was getting older and would probably need medical care in the future. The 
home could have been sold for fair market value and the difference betn>een its value 
and the life estate value could have been used for her medical needs. Instead of 
reserving her assets to provide for her medical care, she impoverished herself This is 
evidence of an expectation that Medicaid would take care of her tnedical needs. 
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APPLICATIONS - Eligibility Decisions 
703-5 Eligibility Decisions 
1. Deadline for Determining Eligibility 
j A. An eligibility decision must be made within 45 days of the 
date of the application. There Is one exception: a 
decision must be made within 90 days of the date of the 
application If a disability determination mus-t be made as 
part of the eligibility determination. 
If a decision cannot be made before the deadline, document 
I the cause of the delay In the case record. 
B. If unverified eligibility factors do not affect the 
eligibility of the entire household (For example, the 
client has not given proof of citizenship for one child.), 
the application may be approved for those members 
determined elIgible. 
The application cannot be approved if unverified 
eligibility factors affect the whole household. (For 
example, the wages of a working parent are unverified.) 
2. Certification of Decision 
Indicate the eligibility decision on the last page of Form 61A 
or Form 61FC. Record the eligibility decision on Form 727 Case 
-Action Log. 
A. If the application Is denied, note the date and the reason 
for the denial. 
B. If the application Is approved, indicate the date and 
category of assistance. 
3. Notification of Approval or Denial 
If the application is approved or denied, notify the applicant 
In writing of the approval or denial, the reason for the action, 
the policy citation 1n this manual, and the Social Services 
office to contact for information on the income method used to 
determine the spenddown. 
4. ALERTS and PENDS 
Put an ALERT on a case when a change 1s expected to occur before 
the next review 1f that change will not affect eligibility. 
Put a PEND on a case if a change is expected to occur before the 
next review if that change will affect eligibility. Also use 
PENDS to ensure that Information or proofs are collected from 
the client. 
703-5 
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VERIFICATION 
731 Verification 
731-1 What Must Be Verified? 
All factors of eligibility must be verified. 
There is .only one exception to this rule. It.is called "The Prudent 
Person Concept". This assumes that, as a prudent, person, you can use 
your professional judgement to decide if somethitig can be left 
unverified. If you decide to accept the client's- word for something 
instead of verifying it, document it in the case record or 
application form. 
731-2 Who Must Provide Verification? 
It is the responsibility of the applicant or recipient to obtain 
acceptable verification of eligibility factors. Help the client to 
get the verification if the client needs help. 
731-3 What is Acceptable Verification? 
Verification may be those items listed on the Verification Tables or 
other documents accepted by the district worker. 
File copies of acceptable documents in the case record. When a 
narrative record is used to record verification of items for which 
there is no document, attach a sheet of paper in the case record. On 
the sheet of paper, explain how that item was verified. Sien and 
date the paper. 
731-4 Primary Verification 
The verification tables list examples of acceptable verification for 
each eligibility factor for the appropriate category and program. 
Once an eligibility factor has been verified, no further verification 
is necessary unless it is an item subject to change and would be 
reverified at a regular time. 
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formal peer review they ' may request a formal 
hearing before the Department of Health pursuant to 
'Sec. 23-32-2, UCA (1953) by complying with the 
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of Health Care Financing ADMINISTRATIVE 
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essionally recognized medical standards, identified by 
'peer review, the Division of Health Care Financing 
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the federal government contributes to provider rei-
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r It is the policy of the Division of Health Care 
Financing to resolve disputes at the lowest level. The 
following rules are not meant to foreclose the Divi-
sion's preference, for informal resolutions through 
open discussion and negotiation between the Divi-
sion, and applicants, recipients and providers. .. |
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Social Security Act, 42 Code of Federal Regulations 
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'Medical Assistance Program (UMAP) recipients or 
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sely affecting some or all (applicants) \recipients or! 
providers(42CFR431.220). &/'-.* \ }<-*v* J«M f»J 
f
 c. A hearing also is not required'and will not be 
granted to a. provider for Medicaid certification 
surveys, plans of correction pursuant to those surveys 
or inspections of care, when such state' agency action 
is required by' federal' statute; or regulation' to be 
conducted' according to federal procedures '(Section 
63-46b-1(2)(1) U . / C . >A.' (1988)/ 42" CFR,''431/ 
SubpartD).'' "* *on 4 l ^p\iy/u -*• t*M\U\\ l 
(1) Any Skilled Nursing facility (SNF),1 Intermed-
iate Care Facility (ICF) or Intermediate Care Facility/ 
Mentally
 t Retarded (ICF/MR) .whose certification or 
provider agreement is denied, terminated" or' not 
renewed Will be governed by, the evidentiary hearing 
procedures set forth in '42 CFR 431.153,"1 including 
appropriate cross-references to 41r CFR": Part 498, 
with the offering of an informal reconsideration in 
accordance with 42 CFR- 43 U154' prior to^  the cond-
ucting of a full evidentiary hearing. All of the federal 
regulatory citations in this' subsection1 are incorpor-
ated herein a5 if set forth in fuJl. ,"»r« «./'X^*m ' \ 
(2) Any SNF, ICF* or ICF/MR ',whose ''payment 
for new admissions is denied will be governed by the 
informal hearing procedures set forth 'in 42 CFR 
442.118 and 442.119, including'appropriate11 cross-
reference to 42 CFR 489.62 as specifically ^concerns 
SNFs. AJi of the federal regulatory citations in'this 
subsection are incorporated herein as if: set "forth in 
full. •  '• ^ ' 'VN^iV<<1^ h ffa\ W 
2. Applicability >!iU w»o«f» Ji"o^M <^J *n'«fr 
%i
 EXCEPT AS SPECIFIED fHEREIN;,£ THESE 
PROVISIONS ONLY JAPPLY TO^ TITLE XIX 
MEDICAID/UMAP ' RECIPIENTS1, OR^PROVI* 
DERS. These rules do' not apply to initial applicat-
ions for 'medical 'assistance. *A:! Medicaid/UMAP 
1
 applicant who has been denied eligibility for medical 
assistance throughn>the local Office' of Community 
Operations (OCO), Assistance Payments'1 Administr-
ation (APA), Department1 of Social Services ^  (DSS), 
must submit a written request for an eligibility dete-
rmination hearing' to: The Department, of- Social 
Serviced Office of Administrative * Hearings,'^P. 0. 
Box 45500, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0500 V"the 
applicant may deliver the written request in person to 
thelocalOCO. '• ' ' I, ' »-j>'t * ;:•»•!*, ,<^ 
3. Eligibility Hearing for 'both f^on-Medicai 
Assistance AND Medical Assistance •* «*' *» i^»> f ! D \ 
If eligibility for a non-medical * assistance 
program(s) in addition to Medicaid/UMAP' is "at 
issue, the Medicaid/UMAP eligibility determination 
hearing shall be conducted by the Department' of 
Social. Services through the Office of Administrative 
Hearings. Requests for such hearings shall be' sent t^o 
the address in Section 2, above. * All such hearings 
shall be conducted according to DSS hearing rules. 
DSS shall propose a recommended decision concer-
ning the medical assistance issue(s) 'only and shall 
submit it to the Executive Director qf DOH or his/ 
her designated representative for agent/ review. 
Thereafter the recommended'* decision ^hallvbe 
handled in accordance with 'Sections^ 63-46b-12 
and63-46D-15,U.C.A.(1987). '.«»^»;a i Wlty'«fl»| 
4. Eligibility Hearing For Medical Assistance Onlyf ' 
\ AH requests for hearings to consider eligibilityf as 
to medical assistance only, shall be forwardedr by 
DSS to DHCF, A formal hearing in'accordance with 
the hearing procedures herein shall be. conducted I by 
DHCF. ! > M * ^ i v i . r i ,-M '• iU 
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* 5.Definitionsr1^ ? 8 >' ! ' > " • > « 
* The definitions of the5 Utah Administrative Proc* 
edure rAcfi (UAPA), Section 63-46b-l, et seq., U. 
C.JA.* (1987) as set forth in Section 63-46b-2 are 
hereby incorporated by reference. In addition: ' 
a. "Action" means a' denial of Medicaid/UMAP 
eligibility as1 regards an' applicant; denial, termina-
tion, suspension, or reduction of Medicaid/UMAP 
covered services in the case of recipients;' or, a red-
uction or denial of reimbursement for such services, 
findings of licensing survey deficiencies requiring a 
Plan of Correction, failure of DHCF to accept a 
Planj of Correction'required by licensing, or other 
sanctions as'set forth' in "DHCF ADMINISTRA-
TIVE SANCTIONS4 PROCEDURES AND GUIDE-
LINES", R455-22, in the case of providers. 
b. "Aggrieved Person" means any applicant, reci-
pient or provider1 aggrieved by any action or inaction 
of DHCF. '•/ *' ' v 
c. "Date of ^ Action*' means the date on which a 
denial of eligibdity for, termination, suspension or 
reduction' of Medicaid/UMAP covered services 
becomes effective, in the case of applicants or reci-
pients; or, in the case of providers the date on which: 
* (1) A reduction or* denial or reimbursement or 
sanction becomes effective; • * • 
; (2) Notice is given of licensing1 survey'deficiencies; 
or i * ' * • V » 
' (3)J,Notice3isi'giverr,rthat',DHCF will not accept a 
plan of correction of survey deficiencies required by 
licensing. , , „ , , ' . , ». 
d. "Division Director"' means the Director of the 
Division of - Health Care Financing of the Utah 
Department of Health or his/her designated and 
authorized representative. ' • 
* e. "Executive Director* means the Executive Dir-
'ector'of the Utah Department of Health or his/her 
designated and authorized representative. , 
f,
 }*Formal Hearing* means a hearing before a 
hearing officer, conducted in' accordance with 
UAPA. *;4 
" g, "Notice** means a 'written statement of ' the 
action" DHCF intends to take, the reasons for the 
intended action, the specific regulations that support 
(or the change in Federal or State law that requires) 
the' action, the right to a hearing when applicable, 
the procedure to obtain a hearing, and an explana-
tion of the circumstances under which Medicaid/ 
UMAP benefits or reimbursement will be continued 
if a hearing is requested. 
hM "Request for a Formal Hearing"* means a clear 
expression in writing which meets the criteria of a 
"Request for Agency Action* as set forth by Section 
63-46b-3(2)(c), U. >C. A, (1987) by an aggrieved 
person or authorized representative, , , 
6.Notice
 ( , (4 f „' j1 „, / . * 
a. When Notice Required 
Every individual who is affected by an adverse 
action taken by DHCF will be given timely notice. , 
b. Content of Notice ,
 >t r 
A notice under this Section must contain: ', , 
( ,(1) A statement of the action DHCF intends to 
take;
 V t hj / „ k * H| (2) The date the intended action takes effect;
 u 
0) The reasons for the intended action;
 K ! (4) The specific regulations that support, or the 
change in Federal or State law^  or policy, that requ-
ires the action;,
 lt ' . , , ' . * 
I
 t(5) ¥The aggrieved person's right to request a 
formal hearing before DHCF, when applicable, and 
the method by which such hearing may be obtained 
from DHCF; 
' (6) A statement that the aggrieved person may 
represent himself or use legal counsel, relative, friend 
or other spokesman at the formal hearing; and, ' 
(7) An explanation of the circumstances "under 
which' Medicaid/UMAP coverage or reimbursement 
will be continued if a formal hearing is timely requ-
ested. ' * * 
c. Advance Notice ilt '• • « ' '' " • (i ! " 
DHCF will mail a notice at least ten (10) calendar 
days before the date of the intended action EXCEPT 
as noted below: 
(1) DHCF may mail a notice not later than the 
date of action if: 
(a) DHCF has factual information confirming the 
death of a recipient/provider; 
(b) DHCF receives a clear written statement signed 
by a recipient/provider that: -'' 
1) He/she no longer wishes services or reimburs-
ement, or ( 
2) Gives information that requires termination or < 
reduction of services or reimbursement and indicates 
that he/she understands that this must be the result 
of supplying that information; 
(c) The recipient has been admitted to an institu-
tion where he/she is ineligible under the State Plan 
for further services; 
(d) The recipient/provider's whereabouts are 
unknown and the Post Office returns DHCF mail 
directed to him/her indicating no forwarding 
address; * 
(e) DHCF establishes the fact that the recipient has 
been accepted for Medicaid/UMAP services by 
another local jurisdiction, State, Territory or Com-
monwealth; " 
(0 A change in the level of medical care is prescr-
ibed by the recipient's physician; or 
(g) A termination, suspension or reduction of 
Medicaid/UMAP covered services or reimbursement 
is necessitated- by an imminent peril to the public 
health, safety, or welfare. 
(2) DHCF may shorten the period of advance 
mailed notice to five (5) days before the date of 
action if: 
(a) DHCF has facts indicating that action' should 
be taken because of probable fraud by the applicant/ 
recipient/provider; and 
(b) The facts have been verified, by affidavit, if 
possible. 
7. Request for Formal Hearing and Agency Resp-
onse 
Formal hearings are held for "medical assistance 
only" issues. If an aggrieved person's request for an 
eligibility hearing concerns both non-medical assis-
tance and medical assistance, he should refer to R455-
14-1.A.3, above. 
An aggrieved person may request a formal hearing 
within the following -deadlines, depending upon the 
type of request: 
a. An aggrieved UMAP or Medicaid provider may 
request a formal hearing within 30 calendar days 
from the date written notice is issued or mailed, 
whichever is later, by DHCF of an action or inac-
tion. l
 ; 
b. An aggrieved Medicaid applicant or recipient 
may request a formal hearing regarding eligibility for 
"medical assistance only" within 90 calendar days 
from the date written notice is issued or mailed, 
whichever is later, by DHCF of an action or intended 
action. , » < , i 
c. An aggrieved UMAP applicant or recipient may 
request a formal hearing regarding eligibility within 
90 calendar days from the date written notice is 
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-issued or mailed, whichever is later, by DHCF of an 
i^ actipn or intended action. < v ,\ * , , 
d. An aggrieved UMAP applicant or.recipient may 
..request a formal heanng regarding scope of service 
within 30 calendar days from, the date written notice 
is .issued or mailed, whichever is later,, by,DHCF of 
an action or iritended actions \ . ( 
e. Failure to submit a timely request for a formal 
, hearing will constitute a waiver
 fof a person's formal 
I hearing / or pre-heanng rights. A request for a 
'hearing shall be in writing, shall be dated,.and shall; 
.explain the reasons for which the hearing is reque-j 
sted. An aggrieved person may use the hearing, 
.request form which, is attached to all negative eligi-
bility action notices, or the form which is provided in 
t Attachment "A,*- which is entitled "Requests for 
Hearing/Agency Act ion/ DHCF will provide ^copies 
o f . the, form in'Attachment A to all interested, 
persons. The address for submitting a "Request1 forj 
Hearing/Agency * Action" for: (a) Medicaid or 
^UMAP providers; and (b) Medicaid or UMAP scope 
, of service hearings is as follows: , <
 r ^ '^ * 
Division of Health Care Financing
 tii^ilt ' 




„ ( . P.O. Box 16580 . « • » '{ , ; . , 
' ' Salt Lake City, Utah 84116-0580 , ' •, 
u The address for submitting a "Request for Hearing/ 
r Agency,,Action for Medicaid and UMAP applicants 
, regarding eligibility issues is:
 } j | (* r, , 
The Department of Social Services 
~ Office of Administrative Hearings , , ». ,
 : ', . i 
' ^ P . O . B O X 45500 , . . •;. ' • ,, , J j 
\ Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0500 " \ < 
f. Requests for formal hearing wilt be docketed 
and scheduled within 30 calendar days. DHCF as 
respondent shall schedule a hearing or begin negoti-' 
i, ations in the matter in writing within 30 days of the 
date of i5suance) of1 the request for formal hearing or 
r agency action. , . r , 
*\ 8. Denial or Dismissal of Request for a Hearing . I 
, DOH or DHCF may deny or dismiss a(.request fori 
.' a formal hearing if: * ', 
II
 a. The aggrieved person withdraws the request in 
^writing;
 r , , „ , , , ,</ 
b. The aggrieved person fails to appear ata.sche-, 
duled hearing without good cause; or i 
„ c. The provider fails to allow DHCF access to its 
'records pursuant to R455-14-2 below. ' ' , J 
9. Reinstatement/Continuation of Services } 
^ a. DHCF may reinstate services for recipients or, 
suspend any adverse action for providers as defined 
*in Section 5.a if an aggrieved person requests an! 
* formal hearing not more than ten (10) calendar days, 
after the date of action/ ' '" ! ' \ 
' b. DHCF must' reinstate or continue services for, 
recipients or suspend adverse actions for providers 
r?
 until a decision is rendered after a formal hearing if: ) 
J
 (I) Adverse action is taken without giving the ten 
(10) day advanced mailed notice to a recipient/ 
{provider in all circumstances where such' advance 
'notice is required; ' I ' i * ' ' * • ' ' ' ' j 
• ' (2) In those circumstances where advance notice is 
" not required, as set forth in section 6.c.(l); the agg-' 
rieved person requests a formal hearing within ten^ 
J
'(10) calendar' days following the date the adverse 
'action notice is mailed; ' * ' -'• l' "M . <* ' | 
* (3)' DHCF determines that the action resulted from1 
1other'than the'application of Federal or State law or 
^policy, "» ''"'• ' ' / ' ! ; '' l *'^ ' ' w u" 1 
1
 c. DHCF may proceed with its intended action if:* '' r j 
*'"(!) The aggrieved person withdraws his request for! 
f either a formal hearing in writing; or, ,'«'v»» « ' M ' \ 
* u 1 * . . t . i 
• C£ft - - l 
(2) The aggrieved person prolongs ^jthti Rearing 
process without good cause; or, ' « , !j
 r*•.»?'" iH 1 «/rf { 1 
- (3) A recipient's whereabouts, -are • unknown,1 >, as 
indicated by the return of agency mail. directed ^to 
him/her which is not forwardable,u< t^.jVJl ^  u^t ^w^ 
^ 10. Formal Hearing ' . *ttC * $ lrii\ * f - } r 
*,i * a. How to Request a Formal Hearing </ * v*
 (, h * > ' 
A request for a formal hearing must, be made to 
the Division of Health . Care Financing, 2881 North 
1460 West, P. O. Box 16580,' Salt Lake City, Utah 
84116-0580, Attention: "Formal Hearings.*
 v v^ & Tl-j 
b. Notice of Formal Hearing > i" , v<, , J • y 1 [' ; ^ 
DHCF shall notify the aggrieved. person and/or 
his/her attorney, in writing, of the date, t ime and 
place, of the hearing. Notice, shall *be mailed not less 
than ten (10) calendar days, before the scheduled, date 
of the formal hearing.
 (s,, *< ~j *.} f >/ Vs-' 'if 
, c* Form of Papers t •' '>, ^ s "* - *t
 rjj 
All papers to be filed in a formal hearing shall j ^ ,-
(1) Be typewritten or legibly hand-written;^ ,<f s 
' (2) Bear a caption clearly showing,the title;of the 
hearing; , i . \ »" [p ift l ,<\ ^ ^ ^ , $ 1 
,) (3) Bear the docket number, if any; ,«» ' ? *; ^  rr « (4) Be dated and signed by the party or his/her 
authorized representative and shall
 0 contain - his/her 
address and telephone number; and >[ i \ :i i\ . \\\y 
(5) Consist of an, original and two (2) copies< filed 
with DHCF. '" »'< *< "•• •» >* '.^ ' , 
Heanngs may be delayed iuntil* these requirements 
d. Service • - \ >, * * ^ ^ ^ > >' 
, (1) The party filing papers and documents shall 
serve them upon all parties to the formal'^hearing. 
Proof of service shall be filed with DHCf. * *f' r / (2) Service shall be personally delivered or by mail, 
properly addressed with postage prepaid/,one (1) 
copy to each party entitled thereto. When a( party is 
represented by an attorney, service upon the attorney 
shall be deemed service upon the party or parties^. 'K' 
(3) Proof of service shall be^y certificate, affidavit 
or acknowledgment. '' '' •'^ ^ ^ ,4 .* 
(4) Wherever notice by DHCF is required,' notifi-
cation shall be effective upon the date of first.class 
mailing to a party's residence or business address, ')„* 
(5) In addition to the methods set forth,in, these 
rules, a party may be served in any manner permitted 
bylaw. ' i"
 t \ ' ' , . * - V ' V *.,JJ, 
'^intervention "'*"* ^rifu J ^l^K'* 
p
 As permitted by' Utah Code 'Annlk 63-46b-10, 
intervention will be permitted provided the following 
requirements are met: , * '''; , t '° '^'TV ' (1) Persons desiring to intervene' In a formal 
heanng must petition for leave to intervene'at least 
seven (7) days before the scheduled hearing,;unless 
otherwise permitted by the hearing officer. * " * \ 
(2) The petition must contain a clear and concise 
statement of the direct and substantial interest of the 
person seeking leave to intervene in the hearing. * l\ 
(3) Persons seeking affirmative relief, shall state the 
basis of such relief. ' << fi,l<
 ( » ' f,il%l%;'" \ (4) Other parties to the hearing' hiust', have an 
opportunity to support or oppose intervention. '}';< f* 
' (5) The hearing'officer may grant leave'to inter-
vene subject to such reasonable conditions as he may 
prescribe. An intervener may be 'dismissed from the 
hearing if it appears that he has no direct or substa-
ntial interest in the hearing. u\l V j i : - ^ " l , ' U i"*' 
- f Conduct of Heanng r J? •' 'H I'1?! P / l: 'J] *, < 
(1) Formal hearings shall be conducted by an 
impartial hearing officer who is appointed by DOH, 
The hearing officer shall be empowered with 'such 
authority as granted by Section 63-46b-li; et seq. 
- . . „. , . • . , « . . »_„*Z Com ^Co 
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- U. C*** A* (1987), except as may be limited by these 
, ruIes*l,No hearing
 fofficer' shall have, been directly 
r involved tin, the.iinitial determination of. the action in 
( question.'i-'vu^ i^ ,*\ ii/tl m* u<,ji », fw .tiwm 
],(2);AIl formal hearings shall be ^conducted only 
after adequate written notice of the hearing has been 
served.on all parties setting forth the time,.date and 
r
 place of the hearing, , ' ,J,IU.I \ HJ 
»
 v (3) Testimony shall be taken.'under oath) or affir-
mation administered by the hearing officers< „i ;.. • « 
i in (4) Each party shall have the right to:, *,u :. ii 4 \ ~ 
m (a) call and examine parties and witnesses; \ , .u
 t .-. 
.&,(b) introduce exhibits; j p i , ..„*„. . «.w M 1
 t % i> 
„</ (c) question opposing, witnesses and parties on any 
matter relevant to the issue even though the matter 
> ,was not covered in the direct examination; ,., * 
(d) impeach any witness regardless of which party 
first called him/her to testify; and
 lS. v,,,. ^ 
l,, (c) rebut the evidence against him/her. ut 1 41 \*» 
& (5) The rules of evidence as applied in civil actions 
in the courts of this Stale shall be generally followed 
{ in the* hearings.' Any relevant evidence may be adm-
itted if it is the type of evidence commonly relied 
', upon by. prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. 
^ Hearsaytevidence;mayi be used for1 the purpose of 
!
 supplementing or explaining other evidence, but shall 
not be sufficient*by,itself to support a* finding unless 
* it would be admissible over objection in civil actions. 
- The.hearing officer shall give effect to the rules of 
• privilege recognized». by law..,* Irrelevant, immaterial 
;•• and unduly repetitious evidence shall be excluded. , 
(* v (6). »Thc» hearing* officer may order .the taking of 
interrogatories and depositions and assess the expense 
• to the requesting, party if the hearing officer deems it 
, proper. . , ' » • > « / ' j , * _. n . , .« .*, . » 1 
» ,U (7) The*hearing officer; may question any party) or 
„ witness 1 and may admit, any evidence he believes is 
, relevant or material. > M w u i v i* ^ .« » .<-.• 
-<f (8) .The hearing officer shall control the taking of 
evidence in. a manner best. determined to be best 
1
 suited to ascertain the facts and safeguard the rights 
of the parties. The, hearing officer shall explain the 
< issues and the order in which evidence will be rece-
ived., D <nr, «.>M*js>{un.»-in. *r.r<-> MI • JI. 
,.'t. (9)-A J party has the burden of proving, by a prep-
, . onderance_ ofu the., evidence whatever, facts it » must 
establish to, sustain its position. A provider always 
•; has the burden of proof to show that services were, 
! in fact, rendered as billed, -mi > _m L I M < • )..<. 
- *, (10) Jhe burden of proof as'to a particular 1 fact is 
on the party against whom a finding on that fact 
1
 would be required in the absence of further evidence. 
. g. Ex Parte Communications
 t „> < * * • , , , , 
< r ( l ) . Except as otherwise provided below/ ex parte 
\ communications are prohibited.
 t ', v , 
l (2) The hearing officer shall1 decline to listen to or 
accept any communication offered in violation of 
f this rule and shall explain to the oTferor that any 
communication received off the record and in viola-
tion of this rule must be made a part of the record 
and furnished to all parties.
 ; . 
»' (3) This rule shall ^OT apply to; , / " j 1 , 
i *., (a)-The disposition of ex parte1 matters authorized 
^ byiaw^or"-;;; : / ! "hl*\," , ;' 
\* \ (b). Communications concerning "status of the 
hearing and uncontested procedural matters. \ 
\ \
 t h. Continuances or Further Hearings ' ," " ', "~r *' 
\ ^'(1^'The hearing* Officer may continue a formal 
»*' hearing to another'time or place, or order a further 
' "• hearing on his/her own motion or upon the showing 
of good cause, at the request of any party. _,
 ( 
M *' (2) ' Where 1 the' hearing officer determines (hat 
additional evidence is necessary for the proper dete-
rmination of the case,» he/she may at his/her dis-
cretion: V CX t v J.l twV *.» Mu . Wf,|/-;((U i 
i (a) Continue'the hearing to a later date and order ' 
the party to produce additional evidence; or . . ^ ui 
,, (b) Close the hearing and hold the record open in 
order to permit the introduction, of additional docu-
mentary evidence. Any evidence so submitted shall be 
made available* to both parties and each party. shall 
have the opportunity for rebuttal. ; \, t> ,»!„»>' 
(3) Written notice of the time and place of a con-
tinued or further hearing shall be given in accordance 
with Section lO.b, except that when a continuance is 
ordered during a hearing and adequate oral notice is 
i. Record 
A complete* record of all formal' hearings shall oe 
made. The testimony shall be electronically recorded 
and/or memorialized by court reporter. The recor-
ding and/or memorialization shall be transcribed if 
requested by a party to the hearing. The requesting 
party shall pay the costs of transcription and for 
copying costs. At the conclusion of the formal 
hearing, the complete record of the hearing will be 
maintained in a secured area and shall be considered 
the sole property of DHCF. DHCF or its designated 
agent will retain e lectronic record ings / 
memorialization of formal hearings Tor a perjod of 
one (1) year. Written records and documents will be 
retained for a period not to exceed three (3) years. „ 1
 t tr, 
j . Proposed Decision and Final Agency Review *' " v 
(1) At the conclusion of the formal hearing, the 
hearing officer shall take the, matter, under advise-
ment and shall submit to the Executive Director of 
DOH a proposed decision, based on the evidence and 
testimony introduced at the hearing. ,'
 {>t { 
(2) The proposed decision shall be tn writing and 
shall contain findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
(3) The Executive Director of DOH may:
 ( ,. , , \ 
(a) adopt the proposed decision, or any portion of 
the decision.
 { , , * ' * * ' ! ' (b) reject' the proposed decision, or any portion 
thereof, and make his own independent determina-
tion based upon the record.
 ( i t j (c) remand the matter to the hearing officer to take 
additional evidence; and the hearing officer therea-
fter shall submit to the Executive Director of POH a 
new proposed decision.
 )4, (4) Review by the Executive Director constitutes 
agency review and final administration action, and is 
subject to judicial review in accordance with the 
procedures set forth in Subsection 10.1. ,
 s r (5) The aggrieved person or his/her representative 
shall be notified of the final' administrative action 
and the aggrieved person's right to judicial review of 
the action. '
 t ,' (6) When the final administrative action is favor-
able to the aggrieved person, DHCF shall promptly 
take corrective action. , , « 
(7) Subject to provisions for safeguarding confid-
ential information, all hearing decisions shall be kept 
on file for public inspection. ' , 
k. Agency Review ' "" *' ° -L (^ ] . 
Reconsideration. l Section 63-46b-13 Utah ' Code 
Ann. 1953, as amended, is hereby incorporated by 
reference. , 
( j I. Judicial Review' »' '- ? , l i * , , / r ) f T " ! (1) Judicial review of a final agency action may be 
secured by the aggrieved party by filing a petition in 
the Utah Court of Appeals within thirty (30) days 
after issuance of the Executive Directors final 
administrative action. The petition shall be served 
Ctn>ti«Co 
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upon the Executive Director and shall state the 
grounds upon which review is sought. The Executive 
Director shall file with his/her Answer certified 
documents, papers, transcripts of all testimony taken 
in the matter, recommended findings of fact and 
conclusions of law of the hearing officer and the 
final administrative action of the Executive Director. > \* 
•'{2) Judicial review of final administrative action is 
governed by Section ' 63-46b*-16 and Section 63-
46b-l, et seq. U. C. A. (1987), and Section 78-2a-
3,U.C.A.(1953); - r " >'•' " s> : .W:T ; : Miy-W * •„:••• ' 
R455-14-2. Discovery • * , ll ' ' ;, f ";•;'•;'.!;' p* 
\. A. DISCOVERY PROVISIONS 1 ,' \rJ'^;J'^ 
"' The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are inapplicable 
to these proceedings and no formal discovery except 
as set forth hereinafter shall be permitted. Unless 
otherwise limited by order of the hearing officer, the 
scope of discovery -in formal adjudicative proceedjngs 
shall be as follows: ,. \t ;, 
V' l. Review of Applicant/Recipient and Provider 
Records"" ; ' :,;;''; -. ' : ', ] 'M\{\;''.\i' "' ; 
!'( a. DHCF shall be permitted to review all records 
which are pertinent to the hearing which are in the 
custody or control of the applicant or recipient and 
their health care providers. DHCF shall give at least 
three (3) days' written, notice the custodian of such 
document(s). ' .. ^ - , , 
b, DHCF shall be allowed to inspect a provider's 
records which are pertinent to the hearing. Inspection 
shall be made at the provider's business office during 
regular working hours! and After at least three (3) 
days written notice. , ' '.' ' j'.7 ! •' , 
^ 2 . Review of DHCF Records and FUes .j*!- t , , ^ "^ 
.° a. Before the Formal Hearing r 'J . ' *' ' : "' , '] 
v
 Upon prior written request, the aggrieved person 
,or his/her representative will be permitted to 
examine all documents and records to be used by the 
State at the formal hearing, not later than three (3) 
jdays before the formal hearing.'The aggrieved party 
may request the Medicaid Management Information 
System (MMIS) claim file. This will be available, for 
'review fifteen (15) calendar days after DHCF receives 
a written request for the information. V \ "\ ' ".' 
; . b . At the Formal Hearing ,t , 
!
 The aggrieved person or his/her/, representative 
will be given an opportunity to: ' r ' j , ; ' ' /; 
1
 (1) Examine the aggrieved person's' case file and 
all documents, and records to be used by DHCF at 
thehearing; , '" . ( , J , ^ , , , . (2) Bring witnesses to the hearing; and , J ^ 
(3) Establish all pertinent facts and circumstances.. ' 
^ 3 . Pre-hearing Procedure . "/ '" \]''*'"'r ^ V''V 7
 a.' The hearing of ficer may elect td hold ^ p r e -
hearing meeting for any of the following reasons:''
 ? ."'V ; 
.' '(1) to formulate or simplify the issues; ' '' ; ; 
(2) to obtain admissions of, fact and documents 
which will avoid unnecessary proof; ,' , • . 
'"(3) to arrange for the exchange of.proposed exhi-
bits or prepared expert testimony;
 n , \ '\'? ~/r (A) to! outline procedures to .be followed, at the 
formal hearing; or 
(5) to agree to such other matters as may expedite 
r the orderly, conduct pfv the hearing or tthe settlement 
.thereof./";* '"•,/•! ""V^..,i' .'"'.'' ., "/' *'?:'•' 
•' 'Agreements reached during the conference shall be 
recorded or the parties may enter into a written sti-
pulation or agree to a. statement made on thef record 
by the hearing officer,^ ' -, "n .'*' , .'.',!' 
" 4. ' Interrogatories. Depositions, and Requests ' for 
Admissions ,
 f ( ,, ;. v. _,, 
L a.,,. The/ hearing officer, may order the
 |{ uking ( qf 
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interrogatories and depositions, and • seti "appropriate 
time-frames, assess sanctions for"ndri-compliance, 
and assess the expense to therequesting?p«utyvif>thc 
hearing officer deems it proper, ? *f v if!' •* ^ : ' f'*&*& &%$-
*' b. The<hearing officer maye permit the Tiling' of 
Requests .for -Admission,^ set' 'appropriate<time-
frames for responses, and assess sanctions'foi*1 non^ 
compliance. ' « • •/,'• \\\. ^ j t n ^ ^ ^ t f y ^ ^ M j , 
• \ 5. Medical Examination-** *" l^ >(;j <it^'\\^V',t^iA 
-, a. The hearing officer may order'at'DHCF^ expense 
a medical assessment in order to obtain information 
necessary for a' fair decision.: fThis {information 
subject to confidentiality requirements' shall be\ made 
a part of the formal hearing record.'x i ;:»• iw. I?*«I»{'I u '•'•** 
*.?. 6. Witnesses and Subpoenas '•''• w •«>.'.• '"^  i^f »v »r vj;im 
; » a. A party shall arrange for the*presence*of jlis 
witnesses at thehearing. ir. ^»ra;.v (whzjw^tL'h) 
b. A subpoena to compel"the^ attendance-of5ia 
witness or thV production of evidence i may' be4 issued 
by the hearing officer; upon written' request by a 
party and a sufficient showing of need/ *t. m*f t ^ ii m 
- c A subpoena may also be issued by the hearing 
officer on his own motions ! - ' t M >!»• *' f* &• tow* 
d. An application for subpoena duces tecum-for 
the production by a witness ofr books, papers,' corr-
espondence, memoranda, or other records shall be 
made by affidavit to1 the hearing ? officer. \ The•* appli-
cation must include: ^ f ' •••' •'*• 'l*t^|f:'iifl" d<J ZUlrM". A-
'.• (1) The name and address' of the' person or^entity 
upon whom the subpoena is to be served; t . / ni tys- r, VJ 
(2) A description of the documents, papers, books, 
accounts, letters^ photographs,J; objects,••« or' tangible 
things not privileged, that which the applicant seeks*"v*u;\; 
: (3) A showing of the materialityr ta> the 'issue invo-
lved in the hearing; and ' * :<K-A- . - r t*^ 
. (4) A statement by the applicant that to the best' of 
his knowledge the witness has* such items'ur his pos-
session or under his control. ? . • itiv ivtwM JW A M* 
" e. The applicant shall arrange n o have all"subpo-
enas served which the hearing officer issues to him. 
A copy- of the affidavit presented to»the* hearing 
officer shall be served with the subpoena, ret"»? x^ii.i ;# 
f. Except for employees of DOH, witnesses subp-
oenaed for any hearing are entitled to appropriate 
fees and mileage,; The witness^'shaJP file? a ''written 
demand for the fees with the hearing officer not later 
than ten (10) days' after the date the witness appeared 
at the hearing. ''" << r • M Vmrr 'hv<t&T,fii <*hi ,\m>\ 
7. Sanction by Hearing Officer <n?H;•?. HlM(MJ *^• nf 
i a / T h e hearing officer may"«sanction* orr> penalize 
any party that fails'to obey an f order entered by the 
hearing officer. ' .' *• fopi. n/fr ^  '4is-N»tt'W' x* t 'JI^^ 
R45M4-3. Declaratory Orders^'™"f ^ ^ f £"! 
As required by Section 6 3 ^ 0 - 2 1 , 7 ^ . ' : ^.. A. 
(1987), this rule provides for procedures 'for reques-
ting of DOH through DHCF,' for the issuance^ of 9 
declaratory order determining'* the , applicability" of. a 
statute, rule, or order to specified circumstances^ ^ '.Pw!; 1
 A. DEFINITIONS For purpose? of these1 prpvis-
1. "Agency* means the Division of,"^ealth Care 
Financing, Utah Department of,Healtl).' ^ J ];#;'^ )* * 
h
 2. "Applicability*' means a determjnaiion 'of 
whether a statute, rule, or order should
 ;tjc". applied, 
and if so, how the law as stated5 should, be applied to 
specific facts and circumstances/, ^ ,^./ ^ i^ - i , , .^ ' y 
, 3. /Declaratory Ruling" means an^administrative 
interpretation or explanation of rights^ status, ,and or 
other legal relations under a, specific statute^ ruleV or 
order. -• * ,,..,.. ; u : ...p.. |f ,,TI h . , ^ . •: v > , . , r • 
.• 4. "Order" means an *$ft$:y^on^fy, particular 
C<MM?»C<) 
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